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BOOK REVIEWS
A MODEL WATE CODE. By Frank E. Maloney, Richard C. Ausness, &
J. Scott Morris. Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press,
1972.
A book review of a model code raises some problems of exactly
how to approach the task. One could presumably gather up all of
the extant codes and then, biblical style, annotate the outstanding
text to the proposed model, creating some sort of legal concordance.
Better yet, one could survey the legislatures by means of a Gallup-
type Poll to ascertain whether the proposed law was, indeed, a needed
as well as a possible subject of legislative reform. Having neither
the monkish scholarliness for the former nor the proper tools to
accomplish the latter, I will proceed under a third method, my own
opinion, based on a survey of existing state codes, that the model law
goes for beyond present water regimes, coupled with a sneaking
suspicion that too many state legislatures are, as of yet, unwilling to
adopt the far reaching reforms proposed in the Model Water Code.
A Model Water Code is prefaced by the known if not accepted
fact that the United States is in a water crisis. The authors note that,
"In 1900, total water use in America amounted to only 40 billion
gallons per day, but by 1965, the figure for daily use of water had
risen to 360 billion gallons." Moreover, "In the period 1900-1950,
industrial production increased about 700 percent, a figure far in
excess of the population growth rate." This latter statistic is most
important in assessing the need for new concepts of water planning
and for a new regime of water law. Industrial growth has led to
urban concentration; by 1980 more than 90 percent of the population
will be located in cities and towns, which necessarily means a lessening
of the amount of rural lands with water holding capacity. More
importantly, industrial uses of water not only are far greater than
domestic uses, they are also different in kind; industrial use both
consumes and pollutes the water. Consequently the only feasible
approach to successful water planning is one that provides for both
quantity and quality controls.
The Model Water Code is based on a concept of water known as
the hydrologic cycle.' Water use classification is now determined
1 For background material see Piper & Thomas, Hydrology and Water Law:
What is Their Future Common Ground, in UNIv. oF MicH. LAw ScHooL, WATEm
Rsouncxs AND Tm LAw (1958).
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on the status of the user, i.e., whether the rightholder is a "riparian"
user or "appropriations" user, or according to the classification of the
water itself, i.e., whether the water is "ground water" or "surface
water," or on the basis of similar artificial distinctions. 2 Eastern
riparian codes, toward which the Model Water Code is directed,
apply the reasonable use doctrine as between competing riparian
users while Western prior appropriations codes declare the first user
of water has a right, as against later users, to continue to use the same
amount of water in perpetuity or to transfer his right in the market-
place. Both regimes are inequitable to later users, and the riparian
system is also of uncertain legal application, since decisions as to
competing uses must be made on a case-by-case basis. Recent legisla-
tive proposals for adopting the appropriations system in Eastern
riparian states have been forwarded and accepted in at least one
jurisdiction; however, the authors reject appropriations codes as cre-
ating or continuing the same sort of inequities against later users as
well as being economically inefficient by "freezing" types and amounts
of water use.
The Model Water Code takes the approach first forwarded in the
Model Water Use Act of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in 1958. It is a balance of reasonable use and prior appropriations
regulated through a permit system under the direction of a state
water agency. The most important changes under the proposed
Model Water Code would be the elimination of vested rights in water
through the substitution of durational permits and the substitution of
a reasonable-beneficial use concept of water allocation as between
competing users in place of reasonable use under present riparian law.
Vested rights in water and the Model Water Code's "public trust"
doctrine are interrelated concepts. In § 1.02 Declaration of Policy,
the Code declares, "the waters of the state are the property of the state
and are held in public trust for the benefit of its citizens ... " and,
".... the people of the state as beneficiaries of this trust have a right
to have the waters protected for their use." Water rights as property
rights are not firmly entrenched in Anglo-American law; in fact, the
courts have generally defined rights in water as being usufructuary
and subject to reasonable use. The public trust doctrine, as well, is
one of recent origin in United States Supreme Court history developed
to define the police powers of the state to regulate public and private
activity with regard to land and land titles. The two become in-
separable when providing a legal basis for state action through legisla-
2 See generally Morse, The Cost of Purity, 7 VALP Aiso L. REv. 169 (1973).
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tion and enforcement and for citizen standing in the courts to protect
the res of the trust, i.e., the environment.3
Reasonable-beneficial use is defined in § 1.03 of the Code as, "The
use of water in such a quantity as is necessary for economic and
efficient utilization, for a purpose and in a manner which is both
reasonable and consistent with the public interest." This must be
read in conjunction with § 1.02 (3) which declares beneficial uses to
include, "domestic uses, irrigation, power development, mining, and
industrial uses," as well as requiring that in the public interest "....
adequate provision shall be made for the protection and procreation
of fish and wildlife, the maintenance of proper ecological balance
and scenic beauty, and the preservation and enhancement of waters
of the state for navigation, public recreation, municipal uses, and
public water supplies." The commentary underneath this states that
two "classes" of water uses are created by this section, one being
beneficial uses and the other being those in the public interest. This
division appears to be artificial, and the proper formula would be
one that declared beneficial uses to be only those in the public
interest.
Economic efficiency and best possible use theory is a difficult theory
to apply when dealing with competing interests some of which may
have no obvious measureable attributes. Benefit-cost analysis as ap-
plied to natural resources or other collective goods is an unworkable
theory. The concept of "trade-offs" as a potential bargaining tool is
not relevant in the distribution of natural resources because the
individual is far more motivated by his economic self-interest than
by political community interests.4 Weighing public interest uses
against beneficial uses will result in public interests being slighted
because they are incapable of measurement. Reasonable-beneficial
use in conjunction with a permit system of water use and control is
the only answer to management of our most scarce and valuable
resource; however, it must be defined in such a way so as to, if neces-
sary, protect ourselves from ourselves.
If the definitions of use, ownership, and trust are the new deals
of the Model Water Code, then the administrative framework is the
3 Recent court cases granting standing to citizens to protect the environment
include Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. F.P.C., 854 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
cert. denied, 884 U.S. 941 (1966); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v.
Volpe, 297 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). But see Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433
F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), affirmed, 92 S.Ct. 1361 (1972), sub. nom. Sierra Club v.
Morton.
4 See Morse, Model Water Resources Program for International Boundaries of
the United States and Canada, 12 NAT. l~s. J. 398 (1972); Maas, Benefit-Cost
Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Investment Decisions, 80 QUATERLY JoURNAL oF
EcoNoNUcs (1966); Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey, 75 EcoN. J. 683 (1965).
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age-old curmudgeon without which, however, the reformation or
revolution will fail. The authors have included extensive provisions
for public hearings and administrative and judicial review of both
rule making and enforcement decisions. Moreover, they have pre-
scribed a water agency composed of working, full time members, one
of which, ". . . shall be an attorney who has practiced law for at least
five (5) years prior to his appointment; one member shall be a
hydrologist or a professional engineer with experience in water man-
agement or conservation; one member shall be an experienced farmer
or rancher; and the other two members shall be chosen from the
public at large based upon their general education, business qualifica-
tions, and experience with problems relating to water resources."
This is the key to any success in implementing the Model Water Code,
for definitions of reasonable-beneficial use and the problems involved
in changing to a permit system will require full time, sophisticated,
and balanced decision-making. Not the uncompensated, part time,
and too often biased outputs of many state water commissions now
in existence.5 The Model Water Code contemplates a two-tier system
of state and local control based on the assumption that local problems
are more amenable to local solution and that maximum flexibility will
be maintained through local controls. The dual approach is one
favored by the federal government in both the Revenue Sharing Act 6
and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.7 Both contemplate
expenditures by local government units; however, both laws also stress
planning, cooperation, and enforcement by state and federal agencies.
Therefore any system, whether single or multiple in layers of authority,
must ultimately implement one set of standards and enforce one over-
all law; it is only the flexibility that might be available in a state that
has a number of diverse economic and geographic regions that would
make the two-tier system more efficient than a single state agency.
Iowa operates under the single-tier system.
The Model Water Code requires a water inventory of the state
and foresees environmental zoning will be the future of rational
planning for best possible uses of water resources. Not only are
preferred uses possible under the code, but also permit fees may be
5 See, e.g., Ky. R v. STAT. § 224.030 (1970) which provides for a Water
Pollution Control Commission composed of the Commissioners of Health,
Natural Resources, Fish and Wildlife Resources, Mines and Minerals, Commerce,
and the Director of Reclamation, the Attorney General, and three citizen members,
one representing municipalities, one representing industrial management, and one
representing either municipalities or industrial management. No public representa-
tion is provided for, and no compensation is allowed to the members.
6831 U.S.C. 1221 et seq. (1972).
733 U.S.C. § 1151 et seq. (1972).
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used to regulate the use of water and to provide revenues for the
control of water quality. At this point the interrelationship between
water use and water quality control may be most effectively de-
scribed.
Chapter 2 of the Model Water Code covers the regulation of con-
sumptive uses, or the permit system. Chapter 5 of the Code covers
the regulation of water quality control. As water use permits are
essential to the control of water quantity, so are water pollution per-
mits essential to the control of water quality. The approach taken
by the Model Water Code is utilized in Title IV, 'Permits and
Licenses," of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.8 It has also
been implemented in a number of state water pollution control pro-
grams; however, existing programs have failed to combine quality
and quantity control with funding of water resource programs and,
consequently, have turned the permit system into "permits to
pollute."9 Section 5.08 "Discharge Permits," creates two classes of
of permit users. The first class includes any person discharging any
substance into the waters of the state, or, in the case of a person
subject to the jurisdiction of the state, into interstate waters. Within
the first class fall those permits issued for discharges determined not
to lower the water quality in the affected water below the standards
set for that class of water pursuant to the state water quality plan.
The permit is declared to create a privilege and not a right, and this
distinction is made clear by the ten year durational limitation on per-
mits as well as by the procedures for revocation, modification, and
suspension of permits. Class Two permits are those issued on a tem-
porary basis when a Class One permit has been denied. The permit
may only be issued when the board determines that the applicant is
installing pollution control equipment or control is, as of yet, tech-
nologically infeasible and that the discharge will be both in the public
interest and not unreasonably distinctive to the quality of the receiving
waters. A maximum of one year is allowed for a Class Two permit.
Section 5.11, "Fees;" provides that, "The state board may establish
fees for the issuance and renewal of any permits established under
this chapter. All funds collected under this provision shall be credited
to the water development account." The commentary states that such
a fee could be structured to resemble the effluent charge, proportioned
to the volume and strength of the effluent discharged. It has been
argued in another place that the only effective method of both
raising sufficient revenues to finance water quality and water quantity
8id.
9 See Morse, The Cost of Purity, 7 VaAnARiso L. REv. 169 (1973).
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control and to provide sufficient incentive to polluters to reduce the
amount of effluents they discharge into receiving waters is through an
effluent tax based on the actual cost of cleaning up the pollution plus
an additional incentive charge to reduce the present level of dis-
charge.10 The Model Water Code offers the first truly comprehensive
water regime comparable to that in the Ruhr Valley in Germany,
known as the Genossenschaften." It is only under a comprehensive
system of water quality and quantity control that a truly effective and
equitable system of charges can be levied. Without accurate assess-
ment of real damage done by the polluter to the affected water as
well as jurisdictional control over all intrastate, and, possibly, interstate
and national waters, a water resources program is no more than a
sanitation district.'2 For example both quantity and quality of water
used and disposed of is important. Sewerage bills based on water
usage are inadequate because industrial users can decrease the
amount of water used and increase the amount of wastes dumped
into the water.' 3
Definition of water quality impairment and standards of water
quality are, of course, the tools for implementing a water resources
program and define the charges to be levied on polluters. The Code
uses water quality standards of the receiving waters as a primary
tool and effluent standards based on the nature of the effluent dis-
charged into the water as a secondary tool. The former allows flexi-
bility and adaptability whereas the latter may freeze an existing pat-
tern. However, water quality standards are more difficult to set and to
enforce. One problem is how to set individual standards within the
over-all system. Effluent standards or point-discharge limitations may
be necessary as a backup to water quality standards, and constant
surveillance of both discharges and the receiving waters will be
necessary. In the long run, however, water quality standards rather
than effluent standards will be the best method of preserving the
quality of waters in varying conditions. Water quality standards
depend upon the basic definition given in the law to water quality,
l0 See id.
11 See BowER & KNEESE, MANAGING WATER QuALIY: ECoNObucs, TECH-
NOLOGY, AND INsTITUTIONs 237-38 (1968); Fair, Pollution Abatement in the Ruhr
District, in COMPARISONS IN REsoUnCE MANAGEMENT 142-97 (1961).
12See H. BANKS, E. CLEARY & R. KNEESE, RFPORT TO THE DEI.aLA mRVER
BASIN COMMISSION: DEVELOPMENT OF A WATER QuALrrY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
FOR THE DELAWA RWERw BASIN (July 1963); Morse, Model Water Resources Pro-
gram for International Boundaries of the United States and Canada, 12 NAT. REs. J.
388 (1972).1 F. ZwxcK & L. BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND, RALPH NADER'S STUDY
GROUP REPORT ON WATER POLLUTION 327 (1971).
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impairment of water quality, and pollution. The Model Water Code
defines impairment broadly, and pollution is only one form of impair-
ment, so that removal as well as discharge of substances into water
may be proscribed under the Code. Moreover the Code permits
state action when activity is likely to affect waters in a manner
proscribed under the Code as well as when harm is imminent or
actually occurring. A comprehensive water resources program re-
quires the ability to act in a preventive manner and not, as the law
too often does, after the fact.
Chapters 3, 4, and 6 of the Model Water Code are further indica-
tions of both the comprehensive nature of this effort and of the em-
phasis on planned, preventive law making. The authors have attempted
to integrate all activities within the state that have the most effect
on water resources quality and quantity. I am somewhat perplexed
by the inclusion of weather modification and not agricultural spraying,
when the Code excludes air pollution. However, the exclusion of
agricultural activity may be justified on the basis that weather modi-
fication is a little regulated activity whereas agricultural spraying
receives both state and federal attention. In fact the Model Water
Code favors federal legislation and assumes state legislation to be
a temporary measure, in the case future federal regulatory measures
are exclusive.
The final question is whether a Model Water Code has any place
in the growing federal regulation of water resources. There is a federal-
interstate law of water,14 a federal navigation servitude,15 and a Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act;16 however, there is still room for
state regulation 17 and, in fact, the federal government encourages, if
not demands, local activity. The Model Water Code is a much needed
effort, and it will serve the best interests of state legislators, lawyers,
and citizens interested both in saving our environment and getting
government grants to seriously consider the proposed legislative
reform.
Anita L. Morse*
C Assistant Professor of Law and Law Librarian, University of Kentucky
College of Law.
14 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
15 Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900).1033 U.S.C. § 1151 et seq. (1972).
17 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1345 (1972). See also Askew v. American Waterways
Operators, Inc. - U.S. - , 41 USLW 4507 (U.S. April 17, 1973) which held
the Florida Oil-Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act was not preempted by
federal regulatory activity under F.W.P.C.A.
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